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  Multimodal Advocacy for Social Justice1 
David R. Carlson2 
In a video interview with Professor Gordon Hirabayashi, during which he 
reflected on the advocacy in which he engaged during his life to address the 
injustice of the curfews and relocation of Americans of Japanese ancestry 
during World War II, he posed the question, “When does justice take 
place?” This is an especially important question for any advocate of social 
justice to consider because reaching our goal is not as simple as achieving 
justice through providing adequate due process and a voice to a single 
person in an individual legal proceeding. What we are talking about here is 
the more systemic concept of social justice. Professor Hirabayashi’s 
question, posed on behalf of Americans of Japanese ancestry, was first 
asked in 1942, and finally answered by the courts in 1986. Justice often 
                                                            
1  This article originates in David Carlson’s February 2012 presentation at The 25th 
Anniversary of the United States v. Hirabayashi Coram Nobis Case: Its Meaning Then 
and Its Relevance Now, a conference hosted by Seattle University School of Law’s Fred 
T. Korematsu Center for Law and Equality. 
2 David R. Carlson  is the Associate Director of Legal Advocacy for Disability Rights 
Washington and an Adjunct Professor at Seattle University School of Law. At Disability 
Rights Washington, David engages in system-reform litigation on behalf of clients with 
developmental, mental, physical, and sensory disabilities. In conjunction with that 
litigation, David incorporates public policy and coalition building into the advocacy 
strategies employed and he thanks all of his colleagues at Disability Rights Washington 
who bring their various skills to bear in the cases they work on together. He routinely 
engages in outreach and education to people with disabilities, members of the public, 
clinicians, self-advocates, the legal community, and members of the media. In conducting 
this multimodal advocacy, David routinely collaborates with other advocates and 
organizations, both locally and nationally, to coordinate efforts and maximize systemic 
outcomes. One such collaborative, multimodal advocacy project resulted in receiving the 
National Disability Rights Network, TASC (Training and Advocacy Support Center) 
Advocacy Award in 2007 for a report David co-authored on the legal rights implicated 
by the hormone and surgical procedures, known as the “Ashley Treatment,” that were 
used to keep a young girl with disabilities permanently small. David graduated cum laude 
from Gonzaga University School of Law, where he was editor-in-chief of Gonzaga Law 
Review. 
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takes time. The extreme length of time it may take for a person or a people 
to realize social justice has been noted by many seeking systemic change. 
For example, nineteenth-century abolitionist Theodore Parker, twentieth-
century civil rights leader Martin Luther King Jr., and twenty-first-century 
President Barack Obama, each pointed out that “the arc of the moral 
universe is long, but it bends toward justice.”3 
These sentiments about the time it takes to achieve justice do not urge 
complacent patience. Rather, they highlight the amount of work that is 
required before the ultimate goal of lasting justice can be realized. To 
further highlight this concept in contemporary social justice lawyering, I 
will first discuss an example of a young reporter whose work inspired 
systemic justice where a politically powerful lawyer’s work failed. Then I 
will present two additional cases that I was initially unsuccessful in 
litigating, but that ultimately resulted in justice after a multimodal approach 
was used. 
                                                            
3 All Things Considered: Theodore Parker and the “Moral Universe” (NPR radio 
broadcast Sept. 2, 2010), http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId= 
129609461. Parker wrote: 
I do not pretend to understand the moral universe. The arc is a long one. My 
eye reaches but little ways. I cannot calculate the curve and complete the 
figure by experience of sight. I can divine it by conscience. And from what I 
see I am sure it bends toward justice.  
Id. King adapted that metaphor when he answered the question, “How long will it take to 
see social justice?” He said, “How long? Not long because the arc of the moral universe 
is long, but it bends toward justice. How long? Not long.” Id.; Candidate Obama’s Sense 
Of Urgency, CBS NEWS (Nov. 15, 2009), http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/ 
2007/02/09/60minutes/main2456335.shtml. As a presidential candidate, Barack Obama 
told college students, 
The arc of the moral universe is long, but it bends towards justice. It bends 
towards justice. . . . But here’s the thing, young people, it doesn’t bend on its 
own. It bends in that direction because you decide you’re gonna stand up to a 
war that should have never been waged. It bends because you decide that we 
need a healthcare system for all Americans. 
Id. 
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I. THE POWER OF INDEPENDENT ADVOCACY 
In 1972, Geraldo Rivera did some excellent investigative reporting about 
conditions at a New York institution called Willowbrook.4 At Willowbrook, 
there were individuals with intellectual disabilities who were lying naked 
on the floor, in their own feces, all day long.5 Staff did not have enough 
time to actually go through and help people who had difficulty swallowing 
and eating independently.6 Staff would shovel as much food as they could 
into each individual’s mouth and move on to the next individual.7 This was 
all recorded on undercover cameras.8 Geraldo also snuck some of the 
residents out of the institution to interview them with the help of a doctor 
who worked there.9 
After the footage was released, Congress finally recognized there was a 
problem with how such institutions were being operated across the 
country.10 Truthfully, the government was already aware of the conditions 
before Geraldo reported them11—just as it was aware that it was wrong to 
implement curfews and detain Americans during World War II.12 After 
wartime activities, advocacy and education work were necessary for justice 
to sink in with the general public, policy makers, and the courts, and it took 
more than just a few legally knowledgeable people to point it out. After 
wartime activities, advocacy and education work were necessary for justice 
                                                            
4 Geraldo Rivera, Willowbrook: The Last Great Disgrace (WABC-TV New York, 






10 Our History, NAT’L DISABILITY RTS. NETWORK, http://ndrn.org/en/about/about-
ndrn/26-our-history.html (last visited June 1, 2012). 
11 Rivera, supra note 4. 
12 Hirabayashi v. United States, 828 F.2d 591, 600–04 (9th Cir. 1987). US military 
publically claimed curfew and relocation were a military necessity while it, with the help 
of the US solicitor general, withheld the true reason for these decisions, which were 
based on racial and ethnic stereotypes and prejudices. Id. 
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to sink in with the general public, policy makers, and the courts, and it took 
more than just a few legally knowledgeable people to point it out.13 
Similarly, several years before Geraldo’s work on Willowbrook, Robert 
Kennedy went to the same institution, held a press conference at the front 
door, and said “this is a snake pit,” but no one took action.14 Not until 
Geraldo went in and actually showed the general public and policymakers 
what was going on did Congress take action.15 The conversation changed 
when it  was no longer just at the front door on which Robert Kennedy held 
his press conference years before, but instead moved passed the threshold 
and into the institution through the power of video.  The world finally got to 
see what actually happened beyond that front door. 
We must focus on how, as lawyers, we can help facilitate a deeper 
understanding of the need for justice—an understanding that goes beyond 
just pointing out legal violations. This is how we get to the next step, where 
we can create, sustain, and achieve systemic change. The story I just 
recounted resulted not only in redress of the specific injustice that Geraldo 
exposed, but also in the creation of an infrastructure to identify other 
injustices and to provide a means to address them.16 Congress mandated the 
                                                            
13 In 1942, Gordon Hirabayashi refused to follow the curfew and relocation orders of the 
US government because he thought the rules were unjust. He was convicted for failing to 
abide by the wartime orders and appealed his conviction all the way to the US Supreme 
Court, which upheld his conviction in 1943. In the 1987 coram nobis case, the Ninth 
Circuit discussed the historic significance of Professor Hirabayashi’s case: 
[It] never occupied an honored place in our history. In the ensuing four and a 
half decades, journalists and researchers have stocked library shelves with 
studies of the cases and surrounding events. These materials document 
historical judgments that the convictions were unjust. They demonstrate that 
there could have been no reasonable military assessment of an emergency at 
the time, that the orders were based upon racial stereotypes, and that the orders 
caused needless suffering and shame for thousands of American citizens.  
Hirabayashi, 828 F.2d at 593 (internal footnotes omitted). 
14 Rivera, supra note 4. 
15 Our History, supra note 10. 
16 42 U.S.C. § 15001(b) (2000). 
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creation of an independent advocacy group in each state to make sure that 
injustices like those at Willowbrook would never happen again.17 In 
Washington State, this organization is Disability Rights Washington, where 
I work.18 
How do we get our movements to achieve similar levels of results today? 
I think it takes a lot of coordination, and it takes more than just legal 
training, which tells you to think very linearly and syllogistically. 
Policymakers and the general public do not change their minds and actions 
because of an incredibly logical argument. To be truly persuasive, it is not 
enough to point out that if we have A and B, then we necessarily have C. 
This type of reasoning may not even work in a courtroom, as we saw in the 
initial cases dealing with curfews for, and relocation of, Americans of 
Japanese ancestry. The following pages present a couple of cases where the 
standard litigation model did not result in the desired outcome, but where 
other modes of advocacy needed to be implemented alongside litigation to 
achieve justice. 
II. BOLSTERING THE LIMITATIONS OF COURT 
A. McClarty v. Totem Electric 
The Washington Law Against Discrimination (WLAD)19 is a state law 
that prevents discrimination against people with disabilities and a broad 
spectrum of other people falling into protected classes, including race, 
religion, national origin,  sex, veteran status, and sexual orientation (a class 
to which Washington extended its antidiscrimination laws before almost all 
other states).20 At the same time that the legislature was expanding the 
scope of the WLAD, the Washington Supreme Court, in McClarty v. Totem 
                                                            
17 42 U.S.C. § 15043 (2004). 
18 Services & Eligibility, DISABILITY RTS. WASH., http://www.disabilityrightswa.org/ 
about/services-eligibility (last visited June 1, 2012). 
19 WASH. REV. CODE § 49.60.010 et seq. (2007). 
20 WASH. REV. CODE § 49.60.030 (2007). 
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Electric, decided that it would contract the definition of disability under the 
WLAD.21 
McClarty was a fairly typical employment discrimination case that 
worked its way up to the Washington Supreme Court.22 In considering what 
to do with the case, the Washington Supreme Court held that the definition 
of covered disabilities was too broad.23 The court thought that the old 
definition, which protected any individual with a condition that was 
medically cognizable or diagnosable, was problematic.24 The law said that 
an employer should not be allowed to fire an employee because it learned of 
a medical condition.25 That seems straightforward, but the supreme court 
questioned the rule, asking, “what about people with receding hairlines?”26 
A doctor could say that a receding hairline is medically cognizable; a doctor 
can recognize it and diagnose it as a receding hairline. The court concluded, 
therefore, that it would be flooded with people suing for employment 
discrimination after being fired due to their receding hairlines. It was a 
specious argument.27 Washington had protected people with disabilities 
from discrimination for three decades, and not a single case based on a 
receding hairline had ever been presented. Despite this fact, the Washington 
Supreme Court decided to narrow the definition of disability in the WLAD 
to make it conform with the federal Americans with Disabilities Act 
(ADA), which, at the time, included a much narrower definition.28 The 
ADA definition did not cover disabilities that were episodic or conditions 
                                                            
21 McClarty v. Totem Elec., 157 Wash. 2d 214, 226–30 (2006). 
22 See id. at 217–31. 
23 Id. at 228. 
24 Id. 
25 Id. at 227–28, 
26 Id. at 227. 
27 Id. at 229–30.  
28 Id.; Michelle Parikh, Burning the Candle at Both Ends, and There is Nothing Left for 
Proof, 89 CORNELL L. REV. 721, 723 (2004) (while the ADA provides protection from 
discrimination to some people with disabilities, it does not protect all individuals with 
disabilities). 
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that could be ameliorated.29 Under the ADA, many people with legitimate 
disabilities were not necessarily protected from discrimination.30 This 
unprotected group included people with various physical and mental 
conditions.31 
The Washington Supreme Court ruled on the issue of the definition of 
disability without any briefing or oral argument from the parties. Disability 
Rights Washington had not weighed in because it was not representing Mr. 
McClarty, and none of the parties knew that the supreme court was 
                                                            
29 See Respondent’s Memorandum in Support of Reconsideration, McClarty v. Totem 
Elec., 157 Wash. 2d 214 (2006). Because of Toyota Motor Mfg. Ky., Inc. v. Williams, 
534 U.S. 184 (2002) and Sutton v. United Airlines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471 (1999), the ADA 
definition was narrowed considerably to only those individuals with permanent 
disabilities that could not be ameliorated through medication or treatment. Id.  
30 Id. 
31 As the Washington Employment Lawyer’s Association’s amicus brief in McClarty 
pointed out to the Washington Supreme Court, numerous conditions had been found at 
various times to not meet the definition of disability under the ADA. See Albertsons, Inc. 
v. Kirkingburg, 527 U.S. 555 (1999) (vision impairments); Wong v. Univ. of Cal., 410 
F.3d 1052, 1067 (9th Cir. 2005) (dyslexia and other learning disabilities); Calef v. 
Gillette Co., 322 F.3d 75 (1st Cir. 2003) (attention deficit hyperactivity disorder); 
Sheehan v. Gloucester, 321 F.3d 21 (1st Cir. 2003) (hypertension); Orr v. Wal-Mart 
Stores, Inc., 297 F.3d 720 (8th Cir. 2002) (diabetes); Rinheimer v. Cemcolift, Inc., 
292 F.3d 375 (3d Cir. 2002) (pneumonia); Hooven-Lewis v. Caldera, 249 F.3d 259 
(4th Cir. 2001) (hand tremors); Marinelli v. City of Erie, 216 F.3d 354 (3d Cir. 2000) 
(shoulder, arm, and hand injuries); Pack v. Kmart Corp., 166 F.3d 1300, 1305 (10th 
Cir. 1999) (depression); Colwell v. Suffolk Cnty. Police Dep’t, 158 F.3d 635, 644 (2d 
Cir. 1998) (chronic back pain); McKay v. Toyota Motor Mfg., 110 F.3d 369, 373 (6th 
Cir. 1997) (carpal tunnel syndrome); Bridges v. Bossier, 92 F.3d 329, 334 (5th 
Cir.1996) (hemophilia); Heilweil v. Mount Sinai Hosp.,  32 F.3d 718, 724 (2d Cir. 1994), 
cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1147 (1995) (asthma); Bolton v. Scrivener, Inc., 36 F.3d 939, 
943–44 (10th Cir. 1994) (back and leg injuries); Turner v. Sullivan Univ. Sys., 420 F. 
Supp. 2d 773, 784 (D. Ky. 2006) (cancer); Ruhlmann v. Ulster Cnty., 234 F. Supp. 2d 
140, 177 (N.D.N.Y. 2002) (bipolar disorder); Sink v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 147 F. 
Supp. 2d 1085, 1095 (D. Kan. 2001) (strokes); Epstein v. Kalvin-Miller Int’l, Inc., 100 
F. Supp. 2d 222, 229 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (holding that although heart conditions, 
including coronary artery disease, is not a disability under the ADA, heart disease 
was a disability under New York law, which has a definition similar to Washington’s 
former definition); Tedeschi v. Sysco Foods of Phila., Inc., 2000 WL 1281266 (E.D. Pa. 
2000) (post-traumatic stress disorder); Hazeldine v. Beverage Media Ltd., 954 F. Supp. 
697, 705 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (morbid obesity); Graver v. Nat’l Eng’g Co., 1995 WL 
443944 (N.D. Ill. July 25, 1995) (arthritis resulting in a severe limp); Riblett v. Boeing 
Co., 1995 WL 580053 at 6 (D. Kan. 1995) (visuopraxis). 
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considering drastically narrowing the definition of disability. After the 
decision came down, a group of lawyers from the plaintiffs’ bar, including 
Disabilty Rights Washington, tried to come up with solutions. We thought 
of filing a motion for reconsideration, accompanied by several amicus 
briefs, to describe the unintended consequences that would result from the 
Washington Supreme Court’s decision. We thought that the court obviously 
did not intend for this to happen, that it must not have known what its 
decision would mean for broad groups of people with disabilities. Although 
a motion to reconsider is usually a long shot, we thought that if the court 
was ever going to reconsider its decision, it would be here. 
Unfortunately, the briefing did not work. The supreme court let its 
decision narrowing the definition of disability stand. So what did we do? 
We did not throw our up hands and say, “that’s just the way it is.” 
Disability Rights Washington immediately contacted a number of 
community organizations and engaged in community advocacy. We did not 
just approach the usual suspects—those people who were already plugged 
into advocacy groups and knew about disability rights. We went to the King 
County Martin Luther King Day Celebration that happens every year. 
Before the annual march, they hold a great educational event designed to 
teach people about a variety of issues related to civil rights. We used this 
opportunity to show those attending that the “disability issue” was 
everyone’s issue. Washington had always prided itself in having the 
broadest antidiscrimination protections of any state in the union, but we had 
now become one of the worst, alongside all of the other states that provided 
only minimum protection for people with disabilities as required by federal 
law. We got a lot of support from individuals and groups. A coalition of 
about fifty different advocacy organizations rallied behind this issue. 
Disability Rights Washington also approached media outlets to inform 
even more people, like those who might not have self-identified as civil 
rights advocates, but who could still see the injustice of the Washington 
Supreme Court’s decision. Disability Rights Washington and the 
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Washington State Human Rights Commission co-hosted a public forum to 
ensure that we would have a record to take to legislators to show them that 
Washingtonians did not want to limit the types of disabilities protected from 
discrimination. 
It is important not to lose sight of the additional advocacy modalities that 
we, as lawyers, can use in addition to litigation. The legislators heard the 
community of people who gathered to support antidiscrimination protection 
for a greater number of people with disabilities. Six short months after the 
initial court ruling, the legislature passed a law clarifying that it wanted a 
very inclusive definition of disabilities, one that broadly protected against 
discrimination.32 What followed in the wake of McClarty demonstrates that 
even when a particular legal battle is lost, we can still move forward and 
affect change. 
B. Not Guilty by Reason of Insanity 
The limitations of courts came up again in the context of a case dealing 
with people who had been found not guilty by reason of insanity. The not 
guilty by reason of insanity defense is not used very often, and, when it is, 
the defense is usually only used by an individual who has done something 
really bad and is looking at a very long sentence.33 Therefore, you have 
individuals whom a judge, or a jury of their peers, has determined did not 
have volitional control over their actions and should not  be punished.34 As 
                                                            
32 See WASH. REV. CODE § 49.60.040 (2007). The legislature found that the Washington 
Supreme Court, in its opinion in McClarty v. Totem Electric, failed to recognize that the 
law against discrimination affords to state residents protections that are wholly 
independent of those afforded by the federal ADA, and that the law against 
discrimination has provided such protections for many years prior to passage of the 
federal act. 2007 Wash. Legis. Serv. ch. 317, § 1. 
33 A Guide to Mental Illness and the Criminal Justice System: A Systems Guide for 
Families and Consumers, NAT’L ALLIANCE ON MENTAL ILLNESS 25, available at 
http://www.nami.org/Content/NavigationMenu/NAMILand/CJguidetomentalillnessandcj
system.pdf (last visited July 27, 2012). 
34 See Jones v. United States, 463 U.S. 354, 363, 369 (1983). 
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a result, the judges or juries find such defendants not guilty.35 Because of 
the mental illness that contributed to their actions, however, such 
defendants are committed to secure psychiatric hospitals to receive 
treatment until their mental illness is cured or they are no longer considered 
dangerous.36 
Coming to the conclusion that a person who admits to doing something 
especially heinous should receive treatment instead of punishment is just as 
difficult for jurors as it is for the general public because jurors are the 
general public. It is, therefore, a very high standard to prove to a jury of 
your peers that you should go get treatment instead of being punished. In 
Washington, about two hundred individuals have successfully used the not 
guilty by reason of insanity defense.37 While courts have determined that 
these individuals should not be punished, they are still an easy group of 
people to pick on if you are a public policy individual, in either the 
executive branch or the legislative branch and you need a scapegoat for 
some problems. Unfortunately for them, some problems started to arise. 
The problems started in late summer when an individual who had been 
receiving treatment at a state psychiatric hospital walked away from a 
supervised outing to a county fair.38 More than twenty years before, he had 
been found not guilty of a murder by reason of insanity, and in the 
intervening decades, he had received extensive inpatient treatment, and had 
been released from the hospital to live in the community a couple of 
                                                            
35 Id. at 363–64. 
36 Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71 (1992). 
37 Richard C. Veith et al., State Psychiatric Hospital Safety Review Panel—Final Report 
6 (2009), http://www.dshs.wa.gov/pdf/EA/121509SafetyReview.pdf. It should be noted 
that this interdisciplinary team was convened to come up with recommendations to 
address the perceived need for reforms to the treatment of patients who had been found 
not guilty by reason of insanity and nowhere in the report does the committee 
recommend moving the patients into prisons. See id. 
38 Shawn Vestal, ‘Criminally Insane’ Killer Escapes, SPOKESMAN-REV., Sept. 17, 2009, 
http://www.spokesman.com/stories/2009/sep/17/police-searching-fairgrounds-escapee/. 
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times.39 He was in and out of the hospital periodically to get treatment.40 
Here, the individual had been living in the community just a couple months 
earlier. Walking away from a community outing is not the same thing as a 
highly dangerous individual, who is kept under lock and key, digging out of 
his cell and scaling razor-wire fences. If you are a journalist, though, how 
do you report on this relatively uneventful, unauthorized leave from 
supervision while at an outing to the county fair? You write, “‘Criminally 
Insane Killer’ Escapes.”41 And so the panic starts. The public becomes 
fearful that there is an “insane killer” roaming around the community, with 
no context about the fact that, although he had killed a person over two 
decades prior, just six months before the inflammatory headline was 
published he was living in an apartment on his own. 
The individual turned himself in three days later,42 but damage had 
already been done.  The fear and stigma around mental illness were now top 
of mind. Unfortunately, a couple of months later, four police officers were 
killed in Lakewood, WA, while drinking their morning coffee.43 The 
individual who killed the officers was subsequently  killed by police, so 
there was never really a full exploration of whether mental illness even 
contributed to the killing of the police officers.44 It was assumed, however, 
by many—including the media—that the killer must have had a mental 
illness that contributed to his actions because he had engaged in some 
                                                            
39 Vieth, supra note 37, at i. 
40 Id. 
41 Vestal, supra note 38. 
42 Schizophrenic Killer Back at Eastern State, KNDO/KNDU YAKIMA (2009), 
http://www.kndo.com/Global/story.asp?S=11168833. 




44 Lakewood Police Shooting Suspect Killed by Officer in South Seattle Early Today, 
SEATTLE TIMES, Dec. 1, 2009, http://seattletimes.nwsource.com/html/localnews/ 
2010393433_webarrest01m.html. 
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unusual behavior prior to an earlier arrest.45 Those killings added to the 
stigma and negative impressions that the general public had about people 
with mental illness, and created the impression that people with mental 
illness were running rampant killing people. No reporting was done on the 
fact that the vast majority of people do not commit crimes and, similarly, 
the vast majority of the subset of people with mental illnesses also do not 
commit crimes. 
The police killings occurred immediately before the legislative session 
opened. Although no one had been working on issues related to the defense 
of not guilty by reason of insanity for years, it became a top priority in the 
legislature that year. The legislature was going to do something about 
people who are not guilty by reason of insanity. It came up with a plan that 
allowed the secretary of the Department of Social and Health Services 
(DSHS), who runs the state hospitals in which patients who are found not 
guilty by reason of insanity are placed, to transfer such patients to prisons 
operated by the Department of Corrections.46 
Your average lawyer would ask how these people, who have not been 
found guilty, can be put in prison. This did not concern the legislature—it 
can just write down a law and it becomes so. Disability Rights Washington 
partnered with advocates for civil rights and individuals with disabilities, 
and we went to the legislature to inform it of the constitutional problems 
with punishing people after they have been found not guilty. 
                                                            
45 Documents Say Clemmons Had Bizarre Visions, Threatened Jail Workers, KIROTV 
(Dec. 1, 2009), http://www.kirotv.com/news/news/documents-say-clemmons-had-
bizarre-visions-threate/nDRD6/. The shooter had, however, been evaluated by a mental 
health professional prior to being released on bail and had been found to not have a 
mental illness. Id.; Psych Report Found Clemmons Risk to Public Safety, ASSOCIATED 
PRESS (Dec. 1, 2009), http://www.komonews.com/news/local/78250182.html. 
46 ESB 6610 § 2 (2010), available at http://apps.leg.wa.gov/documents/billdocs/2009-
10/Pdf/Bills/Senate%20Passed%20Legislature/6610.PL.pdf. 
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Despite this advocacy, the law passed. The same coalition went to the 
governor to ask her to veto the provision.47 The governor had pushed for the 
adoption of the law, so she ignored the request for a veto. Instead, the 
governor held a press conference in Lakewood, WA, where she signed the 
bill surrounded by law enforcement.48 We had let her know that if she 
signed this bill into law we would take legal action.49 Therefore, the same 
day she signed it, Disability Rights Washington filed a lawsuit.50 We knew 
that filing a lawsuit that quickly, before a single person had ever been 
moved from a hospital to a Department of Corrections facility, might be a 
problem because the court could find there was not yet a case or 
controversy since we did not know which individual patients would be 
moving. However, we knew all patients were at risk of being moved, and 
we did not want a single person transferred to prison. 
Under this law, there is no due process for an individual who wants to 
challenge a move from a hospital to a prison.51 Since transfer to a prison is 
up to the sole discretion of the DSHS secretary, she could decide one 
morning that a particular patient was going to prison, and that patient would 
have no opportunity to stop his immediate transfer. We wanted to get in 
quick, get a preliminary injunction, and have the law ruled invalid on its 
face. We briefed a lot in that case. In just three months, before we got to the 
very first hearing, the docket consisted of over one hundred documents. We 
partnered with an international law firm, Skadden Arps; both their Boston 
                                                            
47 Letter from Mark Stroh, Exec. Director, Disability Rights Wash.; Shankar Narayan, 
Legislative Director, American Civil Liberties Union–Washington; Christie Headman, 
Exec. Director, Washington Defender Association; Teresa Mathis, Executive Director, 
Washington Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers for Governor Chris Gregoire 
(March 17, 2010) (on file with author). 
48 Press Release, Office of the Governor, Gov. Gregoire Signs Legislation to Enhance 
Safety for Communities, Law Enforcement Officers (Mar. 31, 2010), available at 
http://www.governor.wa.gov/news/news-view.asp?pressRelease=1467&newsType=1. 
49 Letter, supra note 47. 
50 Moore v. Gregoire, No. CV-10-00088-EFS, 2010 WL 3222801 (E.D. Wash. Mar. 31, 
2010). 
51 WASH. REV. CODE § 10.77.091 (2010). 
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and New York offices worked with us. We also partnered with three 
different disability rights groups across the nation, each of which filed an 
amicus brief for the case. 
However, as feared, the court ruled the case was not yet ripe.52 The court 
indicated from the bench that it understood the serious legal issues briefed 
by Plaintiffs, and if the DSHS secretary were to create a plan or otherwise 
take steps to implement the new law, we would have a lot more to talk 
about. But until we get to that point, the case is not yet ripe. 
All was not lost, however, because while doing legislative, 
administrative, and litigation advocacy we had been hitting the media pretty 
hard with a television, radio, and print media campaign about how bad this 
law is.53 We were actually finding receptive media outlets and positive 
public opinion, whereas, less than a year before, media outlets had been 
uniformly critical of our clients. We also still had a cadre of lawyers lined 
up to sue the state if it ever attempted to use the law. While the law remains 
on the books for a few more years until it sunsets in 2015,54 the state has 
said it has no plans to use it. 
III. CONCLUSION  
As Professor Hirabayashi found, and these examples further illustrate, 
simply informing a court that your legal rights are being violated is often 
insufficient to redress injustice. He refused to accept that he should give up, 
even as he suffered a significant setback in the form of a criminal 
conviction. Decades passed before he was exonerated. The team of lawyers 
who ultimately got his criminal conviction overturned spent a lot of time 
developing their legal theories and crafting effective arguments. They also 
devoted time and resources to educating and engaging the community and 
                                                            
52 Moore, 2010 WL 3222801, at *2. 
53 See Not Guilty By Reason Of Insanity: Balancing Public Safety With Disability Rights 
(KUOW radio broadcast Mar. 13, 2010), http://www.kuow.org/program.php?id=20216. 
54 WASH. REV. CODE § 10.77.091(3). 
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employed a media strategy. Commitment over the long-term while using 
multimodal advocacy strategies is clearly transferable to any cause, and can 
be used in social justice lawyering engaged in today and into the future. 
 
